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LIMITS OF THE INEVITABLE 
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE IN UNITED 
STATES V. YOUNG:      THE 
INTERSECTION OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY GUARDS, HOTEL GUESTS 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Young, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit confronted the question of whether a violation 
of a hotel guest’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures can be ignored if the 
evidence obtained during the commission of the violation would 
have been inevitably discovered by the police by lawful means.1  
In Young, private hotel security officers invited a police officer to 
observe their search of a guest’s hotel room and personal effects,2 
some of which the police officer ultimately seized as evidence of 
the hotel guest’s suspected criminal activity.3  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s holding that this search violated the 
hotel guest’s Fourth Amendment right and that, under the 
exclusionary rule, the gun discovered during the search should be 
suppressed as the tainted fruit of that unlawful search.4 
The Ninth Circuit in Young correctly affirmed the district 
 
 1 United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 2 On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the government did “not dispute the district 
court’s conclusion that Hilton security should be considered state actors.” Id. at 717. 
 3 Id. at 715. 
 4 Id. at 715, 723. 
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court’s grant of the motion to suppress the illegally obtained 
evidence.  However, the court failed to articulate the clear 
limitations on the inevitable discovery doctrine.  In light of the 
strong argument by the dissent in favor of an expansion of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine when private security guards assist 
police officers in obtaining evidence that would otherwise be off 
limits, Young may have unintentionally set the stage for a 
significant curtailment of Fourth Amendment protections. 
This Note analyzes the Young court’s opinion and the 
potential consequences of the majority’s cursory rejection of the 
government’s inevitable discovery argument.  This Note also 
reconciles the differing applications of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine by the Young majority and dissent and highlights the 
speculative nature of employing the inevitable discovery doctrine 
based on the facts of Young.  Part I of this Note presents the 
background of the case and the historical development of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the inevitable discovery 
doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams.5  
Part II outlines the Young decision and analyzes Young’s 
expectation of privacy in comparison with other cases involving 
similar facts and the inevitable discovery doctrine.  Part II also 
discusses the dissent’s vigorous, but misguided, argument in favor 
of applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to Young’s case.  Part 
III discusses the potential consequences of the majority’s cursory 
examination of the inevitable discovery doctrine and presents a 
more in-depth analysis of why the inevitable discovery doctrine 
does not apply in this case. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On the evening of August 5, 2007, James Johnson, a guest at 
the downtown San Francisco Hilton Hotel, reported to hotel staff 
that a laptop computer, an iPod, and other items were missing 
from his hotel room, Room 13572.6  Hilton Hotel’s Assistant 
Director of Security & Safety, Officer Dirk J. Carr (Hilton Officer 
Carr), reviewed a lock interrogation report7 and found that a copy 
 
 5 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 6 Young, 573 F.3d at 713-14. 
 7 A lock interrogation report is generated by a software system called Saflok. 
Declaration of William Marweg in Support of United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Exclude Evidence, Ex. 2, United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
2
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of the key to Room 13572 had also been inadvertently registered 
to hotel guest Michael Young by hotel front desk personnel.8  
Suspecting Young’s involvement in the theft of Johnson’s personal 
belongings, Hilton Officer Carr called Young in his hotel room, 
Room 13575, to ask whether he had accessed Room 13572, to 
which Young replied “no.”9 
A few hours later, at roughly 8:30 p.m., Hilton Officer Carr and 
Hilton Hotel Security Officer Roger Hicks (Hilton Officer Hicks) 
went up to Rooms 13572 and 13575 to investigate the missing 
items and the room discrepancy.10  They found Room 13572 to be 
completely vacant.11  In Room 13575, the room registered to 
Young, the private security officers found an empty key card 
packet on the bed with Room Number 13572 written on it.12  Hilton 
Officers Carr and Hicks found two backpacks in the room:  one 
under the bed and another in the closet.13  They opened the 
backpack in the closet and found a gun in the zipped front pocket, 
in addition to credit cards and checkbooks in other names.14  
Hilton’s written security policy required that “[i]n the event a team 
member in the course of his/her duties observes or finds a 
weapon in a guest room . . . [s]ecurity shall E-key15 the guest room 
without disturbing the weapon and leave a note on the door for the 
guest to call Security upon returning to the room.”16  When the 
hotel guest returns to his or her room and finds a note on the door 
indicating the electronic lockout, he or she “is to be informed that 
 
Suppress Fruits of Search at ¶ 4, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Marweg Decl.].  Saflok allows Hilton security to determine the 
activity of hotel keys and door locks by running a lock interrogation report.  Id.  This system 
also facilitates the electronic lockout of a hotel room, which can be accessed only by a 
special electronic lockout key issued only to Hilton’s security staff.  Id. 
 8 Report of Hilton Security Officer Dirk Carr, Ex. D, Notice of Motion and Motion to 
Suppress Fruits of Unlawful Search and Seizure; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Suppress, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Carr Report]. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Declaration of Dirk Carr in Support of United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Exclude Evidence, Ex. 1, United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Suppress Fruits of Search at ¶ 6, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Carr Decl.]. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id.; Carr Report, supra note 8, at ¶ 4. 
 14 Carr Decl., supra note 10, at ¶ 6. 
 15 “E-key” refers to the practice of placing a hotel room on electronic lockout.  See 
Marweg Decl., supra note 7, at ¶ 4. 
 16 Hilton Hotels Corp. Standard Practice Instructions, Tab A, Marweg Decl. § 4(A) 
[hereinafter Hilton SPI]. 
3
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company policy prohibits possession of weapons on company 
and/or hotel property and offered a secured location on company 
or hotel property, if available, for the storage of such weapon until 
the time of his/her departure.”17  Hilton Officers Carr and Hicks 
placed Room 13575 on electronic lockout but failed to leave a 
note directing Young to the front desk for advisement of the policy 
and proper storage of his weapon.18 
That same night, when Young returned to his hotel room at 
approximately 11:48 p.m., he was denied entry by his electronic 
key card.19  Likely believing his card had been inadvertently 
deactivated, Young went to the front desk to remedy his access 
problem,20 only to be seated in the lobby as hotel security 
summoned local San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) Officer 
Koniaris.21  There are no facts indicating that Young believed he 
had been evicted or that Hilton intended to evict him from his hotel 
room.  Hilton Officer Hicks, who contacted Hilton’s Director of 
Security, Bill Marweg (Hilton Director Marweg), after being 
informed of Young’s return, radioed SFPD Officer Koniaris and 
requested that he come inside.22  Hilton Officer Hicks told SFPD 
Officer Koniaris that he believed that Young had stolen items from 
another hotel guest.23  SFPD Officer Koniaris asked Young for his 
name and his driver’s license.24  Young then asked if his 
 
 17 Id. § 4(A)(9). 
 18 See Carr Declaration, supra note 10, at ¶ 7; Affidavit of Michael Hamilton, Ex. B, 
Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Fruits of Unlawful Search and Seizure; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Suppress § 5, United States 
v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2007). 
 19 Marweg Decl., supra note 7, at ¶ 14. 
 20 Judge Goodwin, who wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Young, 
hypothesized that “Young might reasonably have believed his key to be defective or 
demagnetized, rather than suspecting that he had been evicted from the room.” United 
States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 21 Report of Hilton Security Officer Roger Hicks, Ex. C, Notice of Motion and Motion 
to Suppress Fruits of Unlawful Search and Seizure; Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion to Suppress, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Hicks Report]; Declaration of Officer Michael P. Koniaris in 
Support of United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Evidence, Ex. 4, 
United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Fruits of Search at ¶ 3, United 
States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Koniaris 
Decl.]. 
 22 Declaration of Roger Hicks in Support of United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Exclude Evidence, Ex. 3, United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Suppress Fruits of Search at ¶ 6, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Hicks Decl.]. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 4. 
4
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companion could leave, to which Officer Koniaris replied that he 
could after Hilton Security Officer Hicks verified that the individual 
had just arrived at the hotel with Young and was otherwise 
uninvolved.25 
SFPD Officer Koniaris exited the hotel and conducted a 
“warrants and identification” check, which indicated that Young 
had been arrested for felonies and misdemeanors in the past.26  
SFPD Officer Koniaris returned to the lobby and engaged Young 
in twenty to thirty minutes of conversation on topics such as family 
matters and Young’s felonious past and prison sentences, while 
awaiting further instructions from Hilton Officer Hicks.27  Hilton 
Officer Hicks then informed SFPD Officer Koniaris that a gun had 
been found in Young’s room, at which point SFPD Officer Koniaris 
and various Hilton security staff took Young to the Hilton security 
office, searched him for weapons, and handcuffed him to a 
bench.28  SFPD Officer Koniaris then called his sergeant to advise 
him of the situation and was instructed that he “could not enter 
Young’s hotel room” without a search warrant, “but that Hilton 
security staff could enter a guest’s hotel room” without 
authorization from a magistrate.29  Hilton Officer Hicks, joined by 
Hilton Officer Carr, asked SFPD Officer Koniaris to accompany 
them upstairs to Room 13575.30  The two private security officers 
entered the room, leaving the door open to allow SFPD Officer 
Koniaris to observe their activities inside the room.31 
Once inside Room 13575, and while still visible to SFPD 
Officer Koniaris, Hilton Officer Hicks removed a backpack from the 
hotel room’s closet and placed it on the bed.32  Hilton Officer Hicks 
then unzipped the front pocket of the backpack to reveal a gun.33  
Upon viewing the gun, SFPD Officer Koniaris entered the room 
and took possession of the backpack containing the gun.34  SFPD 
Officer Koniaris returned to the Hilton security office and arrested 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. The court noted that “[a]t no time did Officer Koniaris read Young his Miranda 
rights or indicate to him that he was a suspect.”  United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 715 
(9th Cir. 2009).  The court, however, failed to identify, analyze and dispose of the Miranda 
issue in this case, and its decision on that issue is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 28 Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 6. 
 29 Id. at ¶ 7. 
 30 Hicks Decl., supra note 22, at ¶ 7, Young, 573 F.3d 711. 
 31 See id.; Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 8. 
 32 Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 9; Young, 573 F.3d at 715. 
 33 Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 9. 
 34 Id. ¶ 10. 
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Young based on his belief that Young was a felon in possession of 
a gun.35 
Before trial, Young moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
that night by SFPD Officer Koniaris, alleging that his Fourth 
Amendment right was violated by the officer’s unconstitutional 
search and seizure of his possessions without a warrant.36  District 
Judge White granted Young’s motion.37  The government 
appealed, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Young 
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room 
and that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to the 
search of Young’s hotel room and the seizure of his personal 
belongings.38 
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE INEVITABLE  
 DISCOVERY DOCTRINE 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.39 
The privacy protections granted by the Fourth Amendment 
extend to an individual who maintains a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his or her person, effects, abode, or hotel room.40  This 
expectation of privacy must not only be subjectively held by the 
individual but must also be “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”41 
The exclusionary rule, a court-created doctrine that prohibits 
the admission at a criminal trial of evidence obtained as a result of 
an illegal search or seizure,42 serves to deter police misconduct,43 
 
 35 Id. ¶ 12.  About two months after Young’s arrest at the hotel, the government 
determined that Young had used a stolen credit card to reserve his room, though that fact 
neither supports nor detracts from the court’s analysis on this issue.  Young, 573 F.3d at 
715.  This fact could affect the court’s analysis of Young’s expectation of privacy, but the 
hotel was unaware of this fact at the time the gun was discovered. 
 36 Young, 573 F.3d at 715. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 723. 
 39 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 40 United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Minnesota v. 
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990)). 
 41 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990). 
 42 Although there has been recent dicta that the exclusionary rule is not 
6
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to protect individual rights, and to preserve judicial integrity.44  The 
rule was first applied in Weeks v. United States,45 where the 
United States Supreme Court reasoned: 
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held 
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be 
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, 
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be 
stricken from the Constitution.46 
In consideration of the tension between citizens’ constitutional 
rights and the judiciary’s role in achieving justice, the Supreme 
Court has created a variety of exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule.47  One such exception, at issue in Young, is the inevitable 
 
automatically invoked as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure (see Herring v. 
United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698-700 (2009); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 
591 (2006) (stating that “[s]uppression of evidence, however, has always been [this Court’s] 
last resort, not our first impulse”)), that specific issue is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 43 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700.  At the core of the current debate over the exclusionary 
rule is whether the only purpose of the rule is to deter police misconduct.  See id. (stating 
that “the exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it results in 
appreciable deterrence” (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984))). But see 
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the exclusionary rule 
protects individuals’ fundamental rights and maintains judicial integrity).  The United States 
Supreme Court majority currently maintains that the rule serves only the deterrence 
purpose, but this particular exploration is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 44 See, e.g., United States v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986) (explaining that 
exclusionary rules are “aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police and prosecution”); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (reasoning on the basis of judicial integrity that 
“[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or 
worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence”); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 223 (1960) (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943) (holding that a 
conviction resting on illegally obtained evidence cannot stand without making the courts 
themselves accomplices to “willful disobedience” of law)); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383, 394 (1914) (implying that to sanction by judicial decision unconstitutional searches 
and seizures would be to affirm an “open defiance” of the prohibitions enumerated by the 
Constitution); People v. Navarro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 164, 170 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (stating 
that the exclusionary rule “is designed to deter police misconduct”); State v. Childress, 666 
P.2d 941, 942 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (describing exclusionary rule as “designed not only to 
deter unlawful police conduct, but also to protect individual rights”). 
 45 Weeks, 232 U.S. 383. 
 46 Id. at 393. 
 47 See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009) (explaining that the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule where officers rely on a facially valid search warrant 
will allow the admission of evidence if either the warrant issued was supported by probable 
cause, or it was not, but the officers executing it reasonably believed that it was); Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (discussing the independent source doctrine, 
which holds evidence admissible if the prosecution can show that illegally acquired 
evidence was also acquired from a source independent of the initial illegality); Nardone v. 
7
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discovery doctrine. 
The inevitable discovery doctrine, which is closely related to 
the harmless-error doctrine,48 permits illegally obtained evidence 
to be admitted in a criminal trial if “the evidence in question would 
inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police 
error or misconduct.”49  The seminal case on the doctrine of 
inevitable discovery, Nix v. Williams, involved a man arraigned in 
the kidnapping and suspected murder of a ten-year-old girl.50  The 
defendant, Williams, had surrendered to the police after a warrant 
was issued for his arrest.51  While two police officers escorted 
Williams from Davenport, Iowa, to Des Moines in a patrol car, the 
young girl was still missing, and two hundred law enforcement 
officers and private citizens had been deployed in the area to find 
her body.52  During the car ride, one of the officers began 
speaking to Williams despite a promise both officers gave to 
Williams’s attorney that they would not engage Williams in 
conversation.53  This discussion resulted in Williams’s eventual 
agreement to direct the officers to the location of the young girl’s 
body.54 
Nix v. Williams is notably one of the few cases to make it to 
the United States Supreme Court twice for review.55  On the first 
appeal, the Court suppressed evidence of Williams’s statements 
 
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (holding that, under the attenuation doctrine, 
evidence obtained illegally can be introduced where the connection between the illegality 
and the evidence “may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint”). 
 48 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967), set out the rationale behind the 
harmless-error rule as follows: 
All 50 States have harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United States long ago 
through its Congress established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be 
reversed for “errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.”  28 U. S. C. § 2111.  None of these rules on its face distinguishes between 
federal constitutional errors and errors of state law or federal statutes and rules.  All 
of these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block 
setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood 
of having changed the result of the trial.  We conclude that there may be some 
constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and 
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed 
harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 49 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984). 
 50 Id. at 434-36. 
 51 Id. at 435. 
 52 Id. at 435, 448. 
 53 Id. at 435. 
 54 Nix, 467 U.S. at 436. 
 55 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Nix, 467 U.S. at 431. 
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on the ground that the police had violated Williams’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.56  On remand,57 the prosecution 
presented no evidence of Williams’s statements, but relied instead 
on evidence of the condition of the girl’s body and clothing and on 
the results of postmortem medical and chemical tests on the 
body.58  On his second appeal, Williams contended that evidence 
of the body’s location and condition was “fruit of the poisonous 
tree”59 taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
because Williams’s statements resulted in the discovery by police 
of incriminating information that was later used against him at 
trial.60  The Supreme Court, however, held that the evidence was 
admissible; in so holding, the Court applied the inevitable 
discovery doctrine for the first time.61  The Court held that the 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence was nevertheless admissible 
because the government had shown that the girl’s body “inevitably 
would have been found” by search crews.62 
The Nix Court explained that the “purpose of the inevitable 
discovery rule is to block setting aside convictions that would have 
been obtained without police misconduct.”63  The Court reasoned 
that if the “prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have 
 
 56 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 406; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating in pertinent part:  “In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense.”). 
 57 In affirming the appellate court’s holding that Williams had not waived his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and that evidence of his statements was properly suppressed, 
the Court stated, “While neither Williams’ incriminating statements themselves nor any 
testimony describing his having led the police to the victim’s body can constitutionally be 
admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its condition might 
well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event, 
even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams.”  Brewer, 430 U.S. at 
406 n.12. 
 58 Nix, 467 U.S. at 437. 
 59 The contention, in other words, was that the evidence was a product of the 
detective’s unconstitutional questioning.  See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 
(1939). 
 60 Nix, 467 U.S. at 440-43. 
 61 The Supreme Court in Nix had substantial support for its adoption of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine from the majority of state and federal courts in the country, and the 
doctrine has developed an even more impressive following in the fifteen years since its 
inception.  See, e.g., United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Fisher, 700 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 
704 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982); Papp v. 
Jago, 656 F.2d 221, 222 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910, 914 
(1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042, 1044 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 62 Nix, 467 U.S. at 450. 
 63 Id. at 443-44 n.4. 
9
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been discovered by lawful means – here the volunteers’ search – 
then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence 
should be received.”64  In supporting its requirement of a 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the Court explained that 
“inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses 
on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or 
impeachment and does not require a departure from the usual 
burden of proof at suppression hearings.”65  The “demonstrated 
historical facts capable of ready verification” in Nix that were 
sufficient to prove inevitability were the following:  the massive 
police-led search teams and their deliberate grid-fashion mapping, 
their close proximity to the site of the body, the trial court’s finding 
that the search team would have resumed and found the body “in 
short order,”66 the teams’ strict instructions to search all ditches 
and culverts (one of which was where the girl’s body was found), 
and the freezing temperatures that the trial court found would 
have suspended tissue deterioration.67 
The Supreme Court was convinced in Nix that the girl’s body 
would have been inevitably discovered by the police force’s lawful 
and aggressive search efforts.68  However, the question moving 
forward from Nix continues to be about less conclusive factual 
scenarios.  Nix’s preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
provided the framework for the Ninth Circuit’s inevitable discovery 
doctrine analysis in Young. 
II. THE YOUNG MAJORITY OPINION  
A. YOUNG MAINTAINED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF  
 PRIVACY IN HIS HOTEL ROOM 
 
The Young court’s first step was to consider whether Young 
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel 
room.69  If he did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his hotel room, no Fourth Amendment protections would extend 
to his belongings that were seized as evidence by SFPD Officer 
Koniaris.  The search would therefore be deemed lawful and the 
inquiry would not need to proceed to an analysis of the inevitable 
 
 64 Id. at 444. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 438. 
 67 Id. passim. 
 68 Nix, 467 U.S. at 449-50. 
 69 United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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discovery doctrine. 
Under firmly established law, an individual maintains the 
same expectation of privacy against unreasonable searches and 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel room as that 
individual would in his or her home.70  To invoke Fourth 
Amendment protection, “a person must . . . demonstrate a 
subjective expectation that his activities would be private, and he 
must show that his expectation was one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.”71  The Young court first analogized the 
facts to those of United States v. Bautista in making this 
determination, and found them to preclude application of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine.72 
In Bautista, the defendant rented a motel room using a stolen 
credit card, though that fact was unknown to the motel manager at 
the time of check-in.73  When the manager discovered the fraud 
after receiving a phone call from the third-party company that 
reserved the defendant’s room, she called the local police 
department and asked them to “find out what was going on with 
[the defendant] and the credit card.”74  If the defendant could not 
explain the credit card situation to the manager’s satisfaction, she 
was prepared to have him evicted unless he could make 
alternative payment arrangements.75  After police officers arrived, 
the motel manager gave them a key to the defendant’s room.  The 
officers knocked on the door and said, “San Diego police.  Open 
the door.”76  The defendant’s wife opened the door and was 
silent.77  The officers asked for and received her consent to search 
the room, but the Ninth Circuit found her consent to have been 
tainted and consequently ordered the trial court to suppress the 
evidence of counterfeit money and related paraphernalia found 
 
 70 See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (holding that “[n]o less than a 
tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, . . . a guest in a hotel 
room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures”); 
United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the “Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to one’s 
home, but also extends to such places as hotel or motel rooms”). 
 71 United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States 
v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. at 586-87. 
 74 Id. at 587. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 591. 
 77 Id. 
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within the room.78 
The court of appeals in Bautista held that the search of the 
defendant’s motel room and the subsequent seizure of the 
counterfeit money and paraphernalia violated the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment right.  The Bautista court based its holding on 
two points: (1) the defendant’s occupancy had not been lawfully 
terminated by management or by the police so as to constitute an 
eviction, so the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the hotel room, and (2) because he retained that 
reasonable expectation, the search and seizure were 
unconstitutional.79  The court found that it was “undisputed in this 
case that the motel’s manager took no affirmative steps to 
repossess the room once she learned that it had been reserved 
with a stolen credit card.”80  The manager never asked the police 
to evict the defendant, pursuant to the motel’s “generally lax 
practices.”81 
In Young, the hotel’s security guards were concerned with 
strictly adhering to hotel security policy.  Their concern for proper 
compliance was indicated by their immediate efforts to contact 
Hilton Director Marweg upon discovering the gun in Young’s hotel 
room.82  Given that nothing in Hilton’s procedure manual 
mandated eviction in the event of a room-key mix-up, there was 
nothing in the record to suggest that Hilton intended to evict 
Young or that he believed he was being or had been evicted.  As 
the majority stressed, “Young’s return to his room and attempt to 
enter it are evidence Young still believed he was a guest at the 
hotel, a reasonable belief given that the hotel had not actually 
evicted him or told him that he was evicted.”83  The court cited 
additional facts that “militate against a factual finding that Young 
had been evicted from his room,” including the following:  Young 
was never told by Hilton security staff that he had been evicted; 
Young’s belongings were never removed from his room; Young 
had not been removed from the registered guest list; Hilton 
security staff did not contact the police after first discovering the 
firearm, but only after Young returned to his room; and at the time 
of the warrantless search and seizure, Hilton security staff and 
 
 78 Bautista, 362 F.3d at 588, 592. 
 79 Id. at 593. 
 80 Id. at 590. 
 81 Id. at 590 (citing United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 82 See United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 83 Id. at 718. 
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SFPD Officer Koniaris considered Young to be in possession of 
the room, based upon their references to the room as “Young’s 
room” and SFPD Officer Koniaris’s statement to Hilton Officer 
Hicks that he “could not enter Young’s room to search it.”84 
The Young court next distinguished the case from those cited 
by the government in support of its appeal:  United States v. 
Cunag,85 United States v. Allen,86 and United States v. 
Jacobsen.87  In Cunag, the Ninth Circuit found that nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police’s entry, search and 
seizure of the defendant’s hotel room because the hotel took 
“justifiable affirmative steps to repossess [his room] and to assert 
dominion and control over it when they discovered and confirmed 
that [the defendant] had procured occupancy by criminal fraud and 
deceit.”88  Cunag involved a defendant who checked into a hotel 
room using a deceased woman’s credit card with a forged 
governmental identification card and a forged letter authorizing his 
use of the credit card.89  The morning after the defendant checked 
into the hotel room, the hotel manager was informed that the 
defendant’s registration paperwork was “irregular,” and he called 
the Department of Motor Vehicles to investigate the suspicious 
documentation.90 
After conclusively determining that the materials provided by 
the defendant to reserve the hotel room were fraudulent, hotel 
management locked him out of the hotel room and contacted the 
local police department to report the crime.91  When three police 
officers arrived at the hotel, the manager discovered that someone 
was using the telephone in the hotel room, which was surprising 
because the defendant had been locked out of the room.92  The 
officers accompanied the hotel manager to the room in question 
and, when the defendant opened the door, the police officers 
smelled a strong odor of smoke coming from the room and grew 
concerned that there was a fire in the designated nonsmoking 
hotel room.93  The officers removed the defendant and his 
 
 84 Id. at 717. 
 85 United States v. Cunag, 386 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 86 United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 87 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 88 Cunag, 386 F.3d at 895. 
 89 Id. at 889. 
 90 Id. at 890. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 892. 
 93 Id. at 890, 895. 
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companions from the room and detained them in the hallway, then 
entered the room and observed a “red hot burner” on the room’s 
stove that had been burning tissue, as well as evidence of stolen 
mail in plain view of the officers.94  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the 
evidence, after finding that the hotel’s lockout of the defendant 
and the room’s other occupants, in combination with registering a 
police report, was “a justifiable ‘affirmative act of repossession by 
the lessor’ [that] is the factor that finally obliterates any cognizable 
expectation of privacy a lessee might have.”95 
The court in Young held that “[u]nlike Bautista, Cunag is 
inapplicable to the facts presented here.”96  In Cunag, the 
defendant had been conclusively evicted, but in Young, the 
electronic lockout was only a temporary measure, as the Hilton 
SPI did not require eviction of a guest upon the discovery of a 
weapon.  Furthermore, at the time of the lockout, Young was not 
suspected of a committing a crime, which may have implicated a 
different clause of the security manual.97  As the majority in Young 
stated, “the intent [of the hotel] apparent to Young critically 
distinguishes Cunag from the circumstances before us now.”98  
The court held that, unlike the defendant in Cunag, Young 
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel 
room.99  Additionally, none of the facts suggested that the Hilton 
Hotel would have taken affirmative steps to evict Young even if 
they had discovered his credit card fraud.100  Young therefore 
maintained both a subjective and a reasonably objective 
expectation of privacy in his hotel room.101 
Similarly, the court distinguished Allen.102  The defendant in 
Allen rented a motel room with cash and, at the time of the search 
and seizure, his rental period had lapsed and the motel had 
retaken possession of the room.103  Upon entering the motel room 
 
 94 Cunag, 386 F.3d at 890. 
 95 Id. at 895 (citing Dorais, 241 F.3d at 1129). 
 96 United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 719 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 97 See id.; see also Hilton SPI, supra note 16, § 4(D) (stating that “[i]f the 
circumstances surrounding a found or observed weapon suggest[] the potential for unlawful 
activity, the local police are to be informed by the Director of Safety and Security or the 
General Manager”). 
 98 Young, 573 F.3d 711, 719 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 99 Id. at 718-19. 
 100 Id. at 719. 
 101 Id. at 720. 
 102 Id. 
 103 United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 697 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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after the rental period lapsed, the motel manager discovered 
contraband, which was ultimately seized by the police.104  The 
Sixth Circuit held that the motel’s repossession of the room 
extinguished the defendant’s expectation of privacy.105  But the 
Young majority held that the facts in Allen were distinguishable; 
unlike the defendant in Allen, Young did not have a diminished 
expectation of privacy, because his rental period had not lapsed 
nor had he been evicted from his room.106 
The Ninth Circuit also found the Supreme Court’s holding in 
United States v. Jacobsen107 inapplicable to the facts of Young.108  
Jacobsen involved the search of a Federal Express package 
initially opened and searched by private employees, and the 
ultimate seizure of contraband contained within the package by 
Drug Enforcement Agency officers.109  The Supreme Court held 
that “the package could no longer support any expectation of 
privacy,” in part because it “contained contraband and little 
else.”110  The Young court agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning in United States v. Allen111 that applying Jacobsen to 
searches of private residences would “make the government the 
undeserving recipient of considerable private information of a 
home’s contents,” and distinguished the facts of Young from those 
of Jacobsen.112  The court reasoned that neither Young’s 
backpack nor the hotel room contained “only contraband” and, 
therefore his expectation of privacy in his hotel room was not 
extinguished.113 
Because the Ninth Circuit found that Young had maintained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room, SFPD Officer 
Koniaris’s warrantless search of that room and seizure of 
evidence from within it violated Young’s Fourth Amendment 
right.114  The court concluded that the evidence was therefore 
properly suppressed under the exclusionary rule.  However, the 
 
 104 Id. at 697-98. 
 105 Id. at 700. 
 106 Young, 573 F.3d at 720. 
 107 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 108 Young, 573 F.3d at 720. 
 109 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109. 
 110 Id. at 120-21. 
 111 United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 112 Young, 573 F.3d at 720-21 (citing United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1021 
n.11 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
 113 Young, 573 F.3d at 721. 
 114 Id. at 723. 
15
Epstein: Limits of Inevitable Discovery
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010
346 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
government argued that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied 
and that, pursuant to the doctrine, evidence of the gun was 
admissible.115  As discussed below, the appellate court rejected 
that argument and affirmed the trial court’s suppression of the 
evidence.116 
B. THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE WAS INAPPLICABLE TO 
ADMIT THE EVIDENCE 
The government argued, as an alternative to its argument that 
Young lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel 
room, that under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the gun would 
have been inevitably discovered regardless of police 
misconduct.117  It is on this point that the Young majority and 
dissent diverged.  The majority narrowly disposed of the issue of 
inevitable discovery, holding that the government failed to show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that Young would never have 
been allowed back into his room; because the failure to obtain a 
warrant cannot form the basis for inevitability, the court concluded 
that inevitable discovery did not apply.118  However, the 
government argued, and the dissent maintained, that the record 
showed that the gun would have been inevitably discovered.119 
What both the majority and the dissent neglected to explicitly 
address was whether the government showed by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the gun would inevitably have 
been discovered by lawful means.  Both opinions left open the 
possibility that the gun could inevitably have been discovered by 
lawful means.  As stated in Nix v. Williams, “inevitable discovery 
involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated 
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment and 
does not require a departure from the usual burden of proof at 
 
 115 Id. at 721. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Fruits of Search 
at 14-15, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007). 
 118 Young, 573 F.3d at 721. 
 119 Id. at 722 (majority opinion) (describing the government’s argument that “once 
Young was arrested and immobilized in the hotel security office, the officer then had not 
only the right, but the duty, for public safety reasons, to take possession of the firearm, 
which he had seen in the course of his earlier search of the room.  Once the police had 
possession of the firearm, that possession became lawful because it was inevitable”); id. at 
727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (stating that “[b]ecause the hotel staff had discovered the gun 
before Officer Koniaris commenced his investigation, it was a reasonable certainty that the 
police ultimately would have obtained possession of the gun by lawful means”). 
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suppression hearings.”120  Over time, the speculative approach 
adopted by the Young court will make the inevitable discovery 
doctrine ripe for a potentially dramatic, and unwelcome, 
expansion. 
The Young majority explained that, if Hilton’s security staff 
had followed the written manual, “it is entirely likely that after some 
discussion with hotel security, Young might have decided to store 
the firearm, or, alternatively, take his belongings with him and 
vacate the room.”121  The Hilton SPI required that hotel security 
officers E-key the hotel room containing the weapon, leave a note 
on the door for the room’s guest and, upon the guest’s return, 
inform him or her of the hotel’s weapon policy and offer a secured 
location for storage of the weapon until the guest’s departure.122  
Young’s room was E-keyed and, under Hilton’s protocols, he 
should have been offered alternative storage options.  Instead, 
upon returning to his room, Young was unable to access his room, 
but he was left with no indication by Hilton personnel of their 
reasons for locking him out.123  Young, therefore, was unaware 
that he had anything but a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
room and reasonably expected to have his hotel room unlocked 
so that he could resume his occupancy.  The majority stated that 
these facts demonstrated a “warrantless search of a private 
residence, not incident to an arrest, by hotel staff working with a 
police officer.”124 
The government argued that no warrant was necessary 
because SFPD Officer Koniaris knew, prior to arresting Young, 
that he had been to prison and that the officer therefore had 
probable cause to arrest Young based upon the report by hotel 
security that Young had a gun in his hotel room.125  The 
government continued that, once Young was arrested and 
immobilized in the hotel security office, SFPD Officer Koniaris had 
a right and a duty to take possession of the firearm.126 
The majority pointed out that this circular reasoning failed to 
recognize that SFPD Officer Koniaris could have and should 
have127 obtained a warrant prior to seizing the gun found in Room 
 
 120 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984). 
 121 Young, 573 F.3d at 722. 
 122 Hilton SPI, supra note 16, § 4. 
 123 Young, 573 F.3d at 717. 
 124 Id. at 722. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Officer Koniaris’s sergeant even told the officer that he “could not enter Young’s 
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13575.128  The court cited United States v. Echegoyen129 in 
explaining that it “has stated in no uncertain terms that ‘to excuse 
the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had 
probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant 
would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment.’ ”130  For additional support, the court cited United 
States v. Mejia131 as authority for the proposition that the Ninth 
Circuit had never applied the inevitable discovery doctrine as an 
exception to the exclusionary rule so as to excuse the failure to 
obtain a warrant where the police had probable cause but simply 
did not seek a warrant.132 
The majority found that “nothing more than speculation – not 
the ‘demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification’ 
required by Nix – support[s] the discovery of the challenged 
evidence outside the improper search by [SFPD] Officer 
Koniaris.”133  The court punished SFPD Officer Koniaris’s failure to 
obtain a warrant by refusing to apply the inevitable discovery 
doctrine, because the doctrine’s application on these facts would 
place the police in a better position than if the illegal search had 
not occurred.134 
C. THE YOUNG DISSENT 
After summarizing the facts of Young, the dissent concluded 
that “the record shows that the police ultimately would have 
obtained possession of the gun based on the situation as it 
existed before SFPD Officer Koniaris unlawfully took the gun out 
of the hotel room.”135  The dissent explained that, because the 
private security actors had already conducted an independent 
search before Young was detained and SFPD Officer Koniaris had 
 
hotel room to search it but that Hilton security staff could enter a guest’s room.”  Koniaris 
Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 7. 
 128 Young, 573 F.3d at 722. 
 129 United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 130 Young, 573 F.3d at 723 (citing Echegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1280 n.7). 
 131 United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 132 Young, 573 F.3d at 723. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id.; see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) (explaining that the rationale 
behind the exclusionary rule has been to deter police from violating constitutional and 
statutory protections and that a way to ensure such protections is to exclude evidence 
obtained in violation of these protections; “On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put 
in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.”). 
 135 Young, 573 F.3d at 726 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
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probable cause, “it was a reasonable certainty that the police 
ultimately would have obtained possession of the gun by lawful 
means.”136  This reasoning is incomplete, however, because the 
dissent essentially sidestepped the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment by failing to recognize that the missing link 
between a suspect in custody based on probable cause and the 
inevitable discovery of evidence by lawful means is a search 
warrant.137 
Another misstep in the dissent’s analysis was its failure to 
explain the “reasonable certainty” of the inevitable discovery of the 
gun.138  It was far from certain how the private actors would have 
proceeded absent the police misconduct.  Given the Hilton 
security officers’ heightened concern for compliance with the 
Hilton SPI, it is equally likely that they would have required a 
warrant before turning the gun over to the police, as suggested by 
SFPD Officer Koniaris’s sergeant,139 or would have independently 
handled the weapon issue with Young and allowed the police to 
investigate the hotel-room theft. 
In rejecting the majority’s interpretation of the hotel’s policy 
and the district court’s finding that applicability of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine would be incompatible with the hotel’s written 
policy, the dissent stated that the “hotel’s written policy does not 
address the situation where, as here, the guest in possession of a 
weapon is a known felon and the lead suspect in an ongoing 
criminal investigation taking place at the hotel.” 140  However, the 
dissent’s application of the facts was misinformed because the 
Hilton security officers were unaware of Young’s criminal history 
and they never indicated in their declarations or incident reports 
that he was a lead suspect in any investigation they were 
conducting.141  The officers were simply responding to a report by 
a hotel guest that items were missing from his room, a task that is 
“in the course of his/her duties” per the Hilton SPI.142  This 
situation was accounted for in Hilton’s SPI and there is no reason 
 
 136 Id. at 727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 137 United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 138 See Young, 573 F.3d at 727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 139 See id. at 715 (majority opinion) (finding that “Officer Koniaris then called his 
sergeant to advise him of the situation.  The sergeant informed Officer Koniaris that Officer 
Koniaris could not ‘enter Young’s hotel room to search it,’ but the sergeant also told him 
that ‘Hilton security staff could enter a guest’s room.’ ”); see also Koniaris Decl., supra note 
21, at ¶ 7. 
 140 Young, 573 F.3d at 727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 141 See generally Hicks Decl., supra note 22; Marweg Decl., supra note 7. 
 142 Hilton SPI, supra note 16, § 4(A). 
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to believe Hilton’s security officers would have departed from its 
mandate, absent improper police influence. 
The dissent’s analysis is also unsatisfactory because it 
conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent that holds “ ‘to excuse the 
failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had 
probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant 
would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth 
amendment.’ ”143  Instead, the dissent seeks to excuse SFPD 
Officer Koniaris’s failure to obtain a search warrant by explaining 
that, at the moment before the unlawful police misconduct, Young 
was already handcuffed and soon to be en route to the police 
station for booking.144  However, this would align the facts with 
those in United States v. Echegoyen145 or United States v. 
Mejia,146 both of which held that the failure to obtain a search 
warrant cannot form the basis for the application of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine. 
The dissent relied heavily on the cooperation of the private 
actors involved.  This cooperation – or, perhaps more accurately, 
acquiescence – must not be confused with predictability.  The 
result would be an inevitable discovery doctrine that would be 
overly applicable to searches conducted by private actors working 
in concert with police officers.  The majority should have directly 
rebutted the dissent so as not to inadvertently help to expand the 
inevitable discovery doctrine.  The dramatic expansion of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine that would result from adopting the 
position of the Young dissent would erode Fourth Amendment 
protections and diminish the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. 
 
 
III.  THE YOUNG COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTLY REJECTED THE 
 GOVERNMENT’S FLAWED INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ARGUMENT, 
 WHICH UNDERMINES FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
Despite the dissent’s troubling reliance on the unwritten 
policies of private security organizations, the majority neglected to 
analyze in depth the theory set forth in the dissenting opinion: 
 
 143 Young, 573 F.3d at 723 (citing United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 144 Id. at 727-28 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 145 United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 146 United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir. 1995). 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol40/iss3/4
2010] LIMITS OF INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 351 
[A]t the crucial moment before the unlawful entry, Young was a 
criminal suspect handcuffed to a chair in the hotel’s security 
office.  Whether or not Officer Koniaris conducted the unlawful 
search of the hotel room, Young’s next destination was the 
police station for booking, not back to his hotel room to pack up.  
Under the facts of this case, no reasonable sequence of events 
would lead to Young retrieving his gun before the police 
inevitably obtained it.147 
According to the government and the Young dissent, the 
opportunity for Young to re-enter his hotel room for his belongings 
had lapsed, and the Hilton security officers were not following the 
written policy when they recruited the assistance of SFPD Officer 
Koniaris.148  As stated by the dissent, the private security officers’ 
failure to adhere to the written Hilton SPI allowed for weight to be 
accorded to Hilton Director Marweg’s testimony that “under such 
circumstances, ‘the police must come to the hotel and take 
possession of the weapon.’ ”149  The dissent suggested that the 
majority and the district court misread the written policies of the 
hotel, and that consideration must therefore be given to the hotel’s 
unwritten policy.150  This argument is without merit, but the 
majority nonetheless should have explored and then dismissed it. 
The majority should have explained that, in the absence of a 
written policy addressing circumstances like those of this case, the 
hotel’s conduct was not sufficiently predictable to support a 
reasonably certain conclusion that the police would ultimately 
have obtained possession of the gun by lawful means.  Finding 
otherwise would expand the inevitable discovery doctrine by 
allowing a court to engage in speculation regarding the actions of 
private security entities.  With the increasing prevalence of such 
entities and a decreasing distinction between state actors and 
private actors, courts run the risk of engaging in inevitable 
discovery analyses that may contribute to the gradual erosion of 
the constitutional protections established centuries ago against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.151  The majority’s holding 
 
 147 Young, 573 F.3d at 727-28 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 148 See id. at 726-27 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. at 727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 150 Id. (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 151 See, e.g., Al Youngs, The Future of Public/Private Partnerships, 73 FBI LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 7 (Jan. 2004) (describing the 1980s and 1990s as the “era of 
collaboration and joint ventures between public law enforcement and private security,” as 
well as discussing the increase of private as exemplified by corporate security and the 
number of gated communities). 
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that the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable here was 
proper, but the majority should have engaged in a more complete 
analysis of the doctrine and made its narrow applicability under 
such circumstances clear. 
A.  AN INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ARGUMENT BASED ON PRIVATE
 SECURITY POLICIES IS INHERENTLY TOO SPECULATIVE 
An inevitable discovery analysis involving the actions of 
governmental law enforcers generally incorporates policies and 
protocols that are widely known, accepted and anticipated.152  
Conversely, an inevitable discovery analysis involving the actions 
of private actors involves speculative elements due to the very 
nature of their private and unregulated behavior and procedures.  
With the increasing privatization of law enforcement and security 
services, therefore, comes the decreasing predictability of state 
action and the increasing probability that illegally obtained 
evidence will be admissible under the inevitable discovery 
doctrine.153 
The Young majority held that the government had not met its 
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Young would never have been allowed back into his room 
because, even “assuming that staff had followed the written policy 
when Young returned to the room, it is entirely likely that after 
some discussion with hotel security, Young might have decided to 
store the firearm, or, alternatively, take his belongings with him 
and vacate the room.”154  However, the majority’s fanciful 
approach to what the “demonstrated historical facts capable of 
 
 152 See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449-50 (1984) (reasoning that the actions 
of an agent of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation in arranging a search team based 
on a grid-mapping system, which demonstrated the predicted course of searching, which 
would inevitably have uncovered the evidence in the case); United States v. Boatwright, 
822 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1987) (analyzing the unlawful search and seizure of evidence by 
police officers without a warrant); United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 
1985) (analyzing the actions of an FBI agent searching an arrested suspect’s motel room). 
 153 See Brian Forst, The Privatization and Civilianization of Policing, in 2 BOUNDARY 
CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 21 (2000) (“Policing is widely regarded as an 
exclusively public-sector activity conducted by sworn officers, but a large and increasing 
share of the aggregate demand for public safety and security is being handled by the 
private sector and by civilians.  As recently as 1965, there were more sworn police officers 
than private security personnel and vastly more sworn officers than civilians — the number 
of sworn officers surpassed the number of full-time civilians employed by law enforcement 
agencies by 8.3 to 1 . . . .  Within 30 years, the number of private security personnel soared 
to about triple the number of sworn officers, while the ratio of sworn officers to full-time 
civilians in law enforcement agencies had declined similarly by a factor of 3, to 2.6 to 1.”). 
 154 Young, 573 F.3d at 722. 
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ready determination”155 would produce did not rebut the dissent’s 
argument that, since SFPD Officer Koniaris had arrested Young 
based upon probable cause that he was a felon in possession of a 
firearm, Young therefore would not likely have had an opportunity 
to recover the gun before it was lawfully seized by the police.156 
The inevitable discovery doctrine permits the introduction of 
illegally obtained evidence if the government can show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the tainted evidence would 
inevitably have been discovered through lawful means.157  The 
doctrine requires that the fact or likelihood that makes the 
discovery inevitable must arise from circumstances other than 
those disclosed by the illegal search itself.158  Inevitable discovery 
“involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated 
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.”159  
As Justice Breyer explained in his dissenting opinion in Hudson v. 
Michigan:160 
[The inevitable discovery] rule does not refer to discovery that 
would have taken place if the police behavior in question had 
(contrary to fact) been lawful.  The doctrine does not treat as 
critical what hypothetically could have happened had the police 
acted lawfully in the first place.  Rather, “independent” or 
“inevitable” discovery refers to discovery that did occur or that 
would have occurred (1) despite (not simply in the absence of) 
the unlawful behavior and (2) independently of that unlawful 
behavior.  The government cannot, for example, avoid 
suppression of evidence seized without a warrant (or pursuant 
to a defective warrant) simply by showing that it could have 
obtained a valid warrant had it sought one.  Instead, it must 
show that the same evidence “inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means.”  “What a man could do is not at all 
the same as what he would do.”161 
 
 155 Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. 
 156 See Young, 573 F.3d at 726-27. 
 157 United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 
Nix, 467 U.S. at 444). 
 158 Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 1396 (citing United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 
862, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 159 Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. 
 160 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (5-4 decision, with Breyer, J., dissenting 
and joined by Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J.). 
 161 Hudson, 547 U.S at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Nix, 
467 U.S. at 444 and adding emphasis, and quoting J.L. Austin, Ifs and Cans, 42 PROC. 
BRIT. ACAD. 109, 111-12 (1956)). 
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The question then becomes whether the private actors’ policy, the 
Hilton SPI, would have led to lawful discovery despite the officer’s 
unlawful search and seizure.  The answer here is “no.” 
Despite the dissent’s insistence that “no reasonable 
sequence of events” would have resulted in Young returning to his 
hotel room for the gun, the government did not prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the gun would have been 
inevitably discovered.  The Hilton security officers were so 
concerned with complying with Hilton Hotel’s policies that it was 
equally likely that, instead of the police officer automatically 
obtaining possession of the evidence by lawful means, the 
security officers would have demanded a search warrant issued 
by a magistrate before relinquishing the gun.  As stated in United 
States v. Mejia,162 the Ninth Circuit has never applied the 
inevitable discovery doctrine so as to excuse the failure to obtain a 
search warrant where the police had probable cause but simply 
did not attempt to seek a warrant from a magistrate.163 
The government did not overcome the speculation prohibited 
in Nix because it failed to foreclose the possibility that SFPD 
Officer Koniaris might have been unable to obtain possession of 
the gun by any method other than a warrant.164  As Justice Breyer 
explained in Hudson, 
The question is not what police might have done had they not 
behaved unlawfully.  The question is what they did do.  Was 
there set in motion an independent chain of events that would 
have inevitably led to the discovery and seizure of the evidence 
despite, and independent of, that behavior?165 
In Young, there was no independent chain of events set in 
motion that would have resulted in the inevitable discovery of the 
gun.  Although the dissent may be correct in pointing out that 
Young’s most likely next destination was the police station, the 
government simply did not meet its burden of showing inevitable 
discovery by a preponderance of the evidence because there 
were multiple possible outcomes at the moment of SFPD Officer 
Koniaris’s unlawful activity. 
B.  YOUNG LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN FOR AN EXCESSIVE EXPANSION 
 
 162 United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 163 Id. 
 164 See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 165 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
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OF  THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE 
This case highlights the importance of the warrant 
requirement and strict adherence to the mandate of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Private security agents do not need a warrant to 
conduct a private search on private property.  Permitting a police 
officer to exploit a private search in order to seize evidence for use 
in a criminal prosecution is a dangerous maneuver around the 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from such unreasonable 
searches and seizures.166 
Relying upon the diligence and investigative tools of private 
security agents would considerably broaden the ability of the 
government to access otherwise unavailable evidence, while at 
the same time avoiding the constraints of the Fourth Amendment 
by limiting the “state action” required to invoke constitutional 
limitations.  By relying so heavily on the written and unwritten 
policies of Hilton’s private security officers, the Young dissent 
encourages over-reaching by private actors and by the police.  
This directly conflicts with the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, 
which itself was a response to warrantless intrusions by British 
officers.167 
Although the inevitability of lawful discovery need not be 
established by clear and convincing evidence – a standard of 
proof that would have been imposed by the dissent in Nix v. 
Williams – the government nonetheless bears the burden of 
proving the likelihood that the evidence would have been 
inevitably discovered.168  While a recommendation of the use of a 
higher standard is beyond the scope of this Note, it is as crucial a 
time as ever to reflect on the purpose of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine and the ramifications of broadening its applicability.  
Based on the likelihood of increased use of private police in 
American law enforcement, Fourth Amendment analysis – 
 
 166 See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (explaining that “a wrongful 
search or seizure conducted by a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment and 
that such private wrongdoing does not deprive the government of the right to use evidence 
that it has acquired lawfully”). 
 167 Heather Winter, Resurrecting the “Dead Hand” of the Common Law Rule of 1789:  
Why Terry v. Ohio is in Jeopardy, 42 NO. 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 5-7 (2006) (citing United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977) (explaining that the framing of the Fourth 
Amendment occurred in response to the American colonists’ experiences with the British 
writs of assistance)). 
 168 See Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I would require clear and 
convincing evidence before concluding that the government had met its burden of proof on 
this issue.”). 
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particularly that involving the inevitable discovery doctrine – must 
focus on the applicable burden of proof.  The standard for 
establishing the inevitable discovery doctrine as an exception to 
the exclusionary rule is preponderance-of-the-evidence.169  Only 
through strict adherence to this standard will the constitutional 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures be likely 
to endure for another two centuries.170 
The government failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the gun seized by SFPD Officer Koniaris would 
have been discovered by lawful means unconnected to the 
officer’s unlawful infringement of Young’s Fourth Amendment 
right.  At the moment of SFPD Officer Koniaris’s unlawful intrusion 
into Young’s hotel room, the demonstrated historical facts 
indicated his suspicion that Young was a felon in possession of a 
firearm.  Young was detained in the Hilton Hotel security office, 
and when SFPD Officer Koniaris began searching Young’s hotel 
room, it was not inevitable that his gun would have been 
discovered by lawful means.  The Hilton security guards could 
have demanded a warrant before turning over their guest’s private 
belongings to the police officer.  Equally likely, Young could have 
been booked into the local jail and released on bail, after which he 
could have returned to the hotel for his belongings, including his 
gun.  Also plausible is that Young’s acquaintance, with whom he 
had returned to the hotel on the night of his arrest, could have 
entered Young’s hotel room after the police left the premises and 
removed the gun. 
The facts as they stood just before SFPD Officer Koniaris 
violated Young’s Fourth Amendment right did not even suggest 
that the gun would likely have been discovered by lawful means, 
as required under Nix for inevitable discovery to apply.171  
Regardless of Young’s next destination, neither SFPD Officer 
Koniaris’s failure to secure a search warrant, nor the facts as they 
stood just before the unlawful police conduct took place, 
supported an application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.  
 
 169 See id. at 444 (majority opinion) (“If the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have 
been discovered by lawful means . . . then . . . the evidence should be received.”). 
 170 The Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, was ratified on December 15, 
1791. 
 171 See People v. Coffman, 96 P.3d 30, 79 (Cal. 2004) (explaining that the inevitable 
discovery doctrine “recognizes that if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the information inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, 
then the exclusionary rule will not apply”) (citing Nix, 467 U.S. 431). 
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Expanding inevitable discovery to apply to such cases would be 
contrary to Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent and would 
jeopardize the privacy protections guaranteed to all Americans by 
the United States Constitution. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit properly affirmed the suppression of 
evidence of the gun found in Young’s hotel room.  However, the 
Young majority should have engaged in a more thorough analysis 
of the issue of inevitable discovery.  If law enforcement is allowed 
to hide behind, and at the same time benefit from, a search by 
private actors, the government’s access to otherwise illegally 
obtained evidence will grow exponentially.  The use of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine to admit such evidence against a 
criminal defendant is precisely the kind of result that the Fourth 
Amendment and the exclusionary rule were designed to prevent.  
Instead, Young has left the door open for those who seek to 
dramatically expand the inevitable discovery doctrine, a result that 
could swallow the exclusionary rule and undermine the important 
privacy rights that the Fourth Amendment was written to protect. 
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